It’s All in Your Head: A Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence by Renz, Graham Louis
University of Missouri, St. Louis
IRL @ UMSL
Theses Graduate Works
4-14-2016
It’s All in Your Head: A Solution to the Problem of
Object Coincidence
Graham Louis Renz
University of Missouri-St. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Works at IRL @ UMSL. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses by an
authorized administrator of IRL @ UMSL. For more information, please contact marvinh@umsl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renz, Graham Louis, "It’s All in Your Head: A Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence" (2016). Theses. 229.
http://irl.umsl.edu/thesis/229
  
 
 
 
 
It’s All in Your Head: A Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence  
 
 
Graham L. Renz 
B.S. Biology and Psychology, Rockhurst University, 2012 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School at the University of Missouri-St. Louis in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 Master of Arts in Philosophy  
 
 
 
May 2016 
 
 
 
                              Advisory 
                Committee 
 
         Jon McGinnis, Ph.D. 
               Chairperson  
 
             Lauren Olin, Ph.D. 
 
              William Dunaway, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
It’s All in Your Head: A Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence | 2 
 
ABSTRACT: It’s uncontroversial that artifacts like statues and tables are mind-
dependent. What’s controversial is what this dependence entails about the ontic status of 
artifacts. I argue this mind-dependence entails that the extra-mental world contains no 
artifacts or artifact joints. In support of this claim I respond to recent arguments proffered 
by defenders of the mind- independent existence of artifacts, viz. those of Lynne Rudder 
Baker, Crawford Elder, and Amie Thomasson. I argue the most plausible story about 
artifacts is that they’re in our minds, not the world; they are merely projections onto a 
world of “indifferent materials”. With this established, I show how many cases of object 
coincidence, the thesis that more than one object may be located in the same exact region 
of space-time, cannot occur. 
KEYWORDS: Material Objects, Coincidence, Collocation, Artifacts, Mind-
Dependence, Powers 
“How could our speaking and thinking in different ways remove the sameness [in kind]? 
The very suggestion sounds like an endorsement of magic.” Elder (2006, 5) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The problem of coinciding objects suggests that two objects, say a lump of gold and a 
statue, can completely and exactly coincide. That is, a lump of gold and the statue it 
composes can both be in the same exact region of space-time. So, if coincidence is true, 
there are at least two objects in the place you ordinarily take there to be just one. 
Reactions to the problem are varied. Some embrace the coincidence of objects, others 
find it absurd, and others claim the problem fails to get off the ground. 1 I take the 
problem to be real, and a theory of objects that avoids coincidence has at least this much 
going for it.  
Philosophers have pursued various lines of argument to avoid coincidence, or at 
least make it less unpalatable. Many claim that either the lump of gold or the golden 
statue does not exist, or that either object at any one time “dominates” the other.2 Some, 
mereological nihilists, deny both the lump and the statue exist.3 Some claim “statue” is 
                                                                 
1
 Two-thingers—those who embrace coincidence— as Stephen Yablo and Karen Bennett call them, include 
Baker (2000); Thomasson (2007a, 73-86); Hughes (1997); Lowe (2003); Fine (2003); Moyer (2006); 
Thomson (1998); Sutton (2012); Doepke (1992); Johnston (1992; 2006, 664-7); and Crane (2012). See 
notes 2-6 for some representatives of the “one-thinger” camp. Those who deny the problem is genuine 
argue there is no fact about the world that properly distinguishes or grounds the differences between the 
two purportedly coinciding objects. Those who pose this Grounding Problem include Zimmerman (1995, 
85-100); Heller (1990, 30-2); Olson (2001); Bennett (2004); Sider (2001, 158-9); and Merricks (2001, 38-
46; 130-4). Lewis (1986, 252) claims arguments for coincidence are invalid, even “absurd”. van Inwagen 
(1981, 128) claims simply to “not understand” the problem. See Paul (2010) for a nice synopsis of the 
debate.   
2
 Michael Rea (2001) and Patrick Toner (2008) argue for an Aristotelian substance-based solution which, in 
a way, eliminates parts when they compose a whole. Crawford Elder (1998) also eliminates lumps and 
masses to solve the problem. See Michael Burke (1992, 1994) for the “dominance” view.  
3
 See Sider (2013); Dorr and Rosen (2003); and Cameron (2010).  
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simply a phase of the real object, the lump of gold.4 Others have denied lumps of gold 
and the golden statues they purportedly coincide with are of the same ontological 
category, and so may coincide in an unproblematic way. 5 Yet others claim lumps and 
statues are numerically singular, although non- identical, objects and can both exist 
without coinciding in a problematic way.6 Although these solutions proffer interesting, 
sometimes revisionary, ways of avoiding the coincidence of numerically distinct objects, 
they have failed to follow an intuitive, promising and metaphysically low-cost line of 
thought. A brief look at the examples used to demonstrate the problem helps bring out 
this line of thought.   
The standard example called upon to illustrate the problem is that of a statue and 
the material, let’s say gold, it’s made of. The statue, let’s call it Goliath, seems to have 
properties the lump of gold it is made of, let’s call it Lump, doesn’t have. For example, 
Goliath came into existence sometime after Lump, and so has different historical 
properties than Lump. Moreover, Goliath has different persistence conditions than does 
Lump. If an angry museum-goer decided to smash Goliath, they would destroy a statue 
but not the mass of gold constituting it. Lump can survive smashing, but Goliath cannot. 
With these differences in properties established, all it takes is the application of Leibniz’s 
Law to show that Goliath and Lump are distinct objects. But the two very clearly occupy 
the same exact region of space-time.  So goes the standard presentation of the problem.  
But other examples, importantly different than the case of Goliath and Lump, are 
called upon to illustrate coincidence. A tree and the mass of tree cells that compose it 
have different persistence conditions, and so are distinct objects. For example, one and 
the same tree stays in existence through a metabolic process that replaces some of its 
parts, leaving behind a different mass of cells. But the tree and its cells very clearly 
occupy the same exact region of space time. A gold atom and the subatomic components 
it’s made of also have different persistence conditions, and so are distinct, coinciding 
objects. (In fact, in the case of any composite object, it seems the collective parts will 
coincide with the whole.)7 But neither atoms of gold nor trees are artifacts like Goliath is. 
And it is a metaphysically important point that neither atoms of gold nor trees are 
artifacts. For, artifacts are mind-dependent objects. It’s incredibly plausible that atoms of 
gold and trees would continue to exist if no mind existed or was thinking about gold or 
trees. It’s less clear if statues, tables, and other artifacts would exist without a mind. In 
fact, it’s less clear statues, tables and other artifacts exist at all—or at least in much the 
                                                                 
4
 See Christopher Brown, (2005, 160-2). Toner (2006), in a similar vein, argues that lumps and statues are 
different relat ions one and the same thing, a lump of clay, can stand in.  
5
 David Oderberg (1996); David Wiggins (1968). See also Kathrin Kosclicki (2008, 181-3), for an account 
of radical overlap, but not total coincidence, between an object and its matter or content.   
6
 Michael Rea (1998); Jeffrey Brower (2014, 165-73). See also, Rea (1997).  
7
 A point recently highlighted by Thomas McKay (2015), who also notes the inevitable coincidence of an 
object and the “stuff” composing it.  
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same way that atoms of gold, trees and other non-artifactual objects do. The mind-
dependence of artifacts like statues and tables, and the account of how such objects come 
into existence, should cast doubt on their ontological credentials. I argue the mind-
dependence essential to artifacts tells an ontological story that locates artifacts in the 
mind and not in the mind- independent world populated by atoms of gold, trees, and 
lumps of clay. With this established I show how Lump cannot coincide with Goliath: 
Goliath exists in the mind and Lump in the external, mind- independent world.  
My goal here is to provide a novel solution to the problem of coinciding objects, 
especially as exhibited by the case of Goliath and Lump. But, as indicated, coincidence 
threatens in cases like those of a tree and the cells composing it and an atom of gold and 
its constituent parts as well. Thus, another account is required for a fully satisfactory 
solution to the general problem of object coincidence. Providing such a solution demands 
a theory of composition and material objects more broadly. Here, I’ll be satisfied with 
just a solution to cases of artifact coincidence. But, if my argument against artifact 
coincidence is true, it will help to explain why cases of coincidence between trees and 
masses of tree cells are of a different sort, and why they need solutions of their own.  
To accomplish my goal, I argue that artifacts don’t inhabit the mind- independent 
world in the way that tress, lumps of gold and other natural objects do. As part of this 
task, I briefly describe our process of object classification and provide an account of 
artifacts. Next, I show how artifacts don’t fit our paradigm of object classification and so 
ought not to be counted amongst the furniture of the world. After arguing for what an 
artifact is not—a mind- independent constituent of the world—I provide an account of 
what an artifact is. Artifacts like statues and tables exist, but merely as conceptualizations 
we, or other suitably intelligent beings, project onto a world of “indifferent materials”.8 
Any unique properties or joints artifacts purportedly have ultimately originate and reside 
in us, and so the objects they characterize may not coincide with the denizens of the 
mind- independent world. After providing my solution to the problem of artifact 
coincidence, I raise and respond to objections to my account. In my concluding remarks I 
suggest why another solution is needed to solve the more general problem of object 
coincidence.   
2. ARTIFACTS AS CITIZENS OF THE MIND 
2.1 Some Remarks About Objects and Their Joints  
Members of the ontological category of object, I take it, are the usual entities with 
which we interact in everyday and scientific life. Baseballs, buildings, chemical 
compounds and sub-atomic particles would all thus count as objects. This much I take as 
uncontroversial. Ontologists make a living arguing about what makes an entity fall under 
                                                                 
8
 I borrow the phrase from Elder (2007b).  
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the category of object or what entities count as genuine, versus fiat or garbage, objects. 
My aim in this introductory section is not to provide a definition of what it is to be an 
object, or even to suggest what the best candidates for such a title are. All I aim to do is 
make some brief remarks about an obvious, but philosophically important, point: We 
come to know and identify objects and kinds by what they do, by how they affect us, 
other objects and instruments in laboratories.  
That is, we classify objects, and they fall under the kinds they do, by and because 
of their external behaviors and capacities. Electrons are those tiny physical particles with 
a charge of −1.602×10−19 coulombs, which bounce between atomic elements and 
chemical compounds in various ways, and are attracted to positively charged particles. 
Sodium, for instance, is that kind whose instances have an atomic number of 11 and 
when placed in an adequate portion of water, explode. Poison ivy, or Toxicodendron 
radicans, is a low-growing, trifoliate plant which contains urushiol, an allergenic oil. If 
we observed a particle with a mass less than 9.11×10−31 kilograms and a positive charge, 
we wouldn’t say we’ve observed an electron, but rather some other kind of sub-atomic 
particle. If we tossed a hunk of a shiny metal into a pool of water, and it didn’t explode, 
we wouldn’t say the metal was sodium. If we came across a low-growing, trifoliate plant 
which didn’t contain urushiol, we wouldn’t identify it as poison ivy. So much is relatively 
obvious.  
The obviousness of these examples needn’t cast doubt on the philosophical 
significance of the point they illustrate though. To repeat: we identify objects by their 
behaviors and capacities. Objects fall under the kinds they do because of the causally 
relevant properties they possess.9 Now, objects might be more than just their causally 
relevant properties, they might be something “over and above” their powers and 
capacities. For all I know, I truly could have been a poached egg. 10 But the fact remains 
that poached eggs only count as poached eggs because of certain causally relevant 
properties and capacities essential to poached eggs. If an object purports to be a poached 
egg, but is made of carbohydrates exclusively and lacks a yoke, we can rightfully call it 
an imposter. Objects might be more than their powers and capacities, but the truth of this 
doesn’t make a difference to how we identify objects, nor does it make a difference to 
how and why objects fall under the kinds they do. If an object has all the powers and 
capacities of an electron, but we attribute some ephemeral, non-causal properties to it, it’s 
hard to see what the latter have contributed to our ontology.   
So what’s the importance of all this? Why am I bothering to tell you that sodium 
has an atomic number of 11, and that if a qualitatively similar metal has some causally 
relevant difference in properties, say an atomic number of 19, that it isn’t sodium, but 
                                                                 
9
 Cf. Hawthrone (2001). See also Ellis and Lierse (1994).  
10
 The example is borrowed from Shoemaker (1998, 69-70). 
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potassium? I make these remarks because I think they clearly support a realism about 
kinds, and help to convince us the world does in fact contain some mind- independent 
joints.11 These remarks certainly do not prove the world has genuine boundaries capable 
of being discovered, rather than invented, but I think such a realism is the most plausible 
and commonsensical conclusion to draw from them. That a molecule with 11 protons 
behaves in very strict, predictable ways and an atom with just a single additional proton 
(and corresponding additional neutron, electron, etc) behaves in dramatically different 
ways, is pretty good evidence for real boundaries in nature. It is not even close to all the 
evidence for this conclusion though.12 But the goal of this paper is not to argue for 
realism about natural kinds; it is simply an important point to make along the way. So, 
this much I’ll assume from here on: what we ordinarily take to be the world’s kinds are 
split by clear boundaries, exist independently of what we or any non-divine being thinks, 
says, or wills, and that at least some of these boundaries are discoverable. 13 What is so 
important about this point though—for the problem of object coincidence and my 
solution to it—is that not all kinds we ordinarily take to exist behave like the kinds 
“sodium” and “electron”. A whole class of kinds, artifact kinds, representative examples 
of which include “statue” and “table”, don’t have clear boundaries. What’s more 
important than the potential vagueness of artifacts though, and essential to my argument, 
is that their boundaries aren’t in the world; they’re in us. 
2.2 Some Remarks About Artifacts and Their “Joints” 
Artifacts are ubiquitous. You’re currently looking at one (a paper, a computer 
screen), and you’re likely sitting on one (a chair), in one (a building), and arrived where 
you are now because of one (a car, a bike, a train). But what is it about an object that 
counts it as an artifact? A good first take on artifacts is that they’re objects intentionally 
created by humans (or suitably intelligent beings) to serve some function.14 This would 
count things like screwdrivers, cars, and computers as artifacts. This is a good first take, 
but it isn’t quite clear it’s totally adequate. It is unclear things like works of art, 
prototypes and “found” objects would count as artifacts on such a conception. My aim 
here is not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for counting an object as an 
                                                                 
11
 Alan Sidelle (1989), a conventionalist about essences and kinds, argues that counterfactuals of the sort, 
“Even if humans didn’t exist, the world would still look very much like it does”, often relied on by realis ts, 
can be true even if the world in fact has no joints. Although I haven’t explicit ly relied on such a 
counterfactual argument yet, I will draw on a modal variant below. Happily, Sidelle’s claims have already 
seen a realist rejo inder, and so I’ll g rant myself use of such counterfactual arguments. See Elder (2006) for 
a response to such “realist-imitat ing counterfactuals”. See also, Elder (2007a, 2007c).  
12
 See Tahko (2012) for other arguments for realis m about both objects and kinds.  
13
 I’ll leave it to philosophers of religion to decide whether or not God can transform me into a poached egg 
while maintaining my identity.  
14
 Hilary Kornb lith (1980), Ruth Millikan (1999) and Lynne Ruder Baker (2004) argue artifacts are 
determined primarily by function or proper function. For opposing views, see Paul Bloom (1996) and Amie 
Thomasson (2003).   
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artifact, but I do, in efforts to avoid many cases of object coincidence, find reason to 
adopt a fully general, working account of artifacts.  
It’s been argued a fully adequate account of artifacts must go beyond intended 
functions if it is to countenance objects such as art, prototypes and other entities we’d 
normally consider to be artifacts as such (Thomasson 2005, 2014). To see why, consider 
the following. The intended function of a chair is to provide support for a sitting person. 
But, in some cases, chair-producers make objects qualitatively identical to chairs, but not 
with the intended function of supporting a sitting person. A chair-producer might make 
such an object for aesthetic purposes only, perhaps for decorating a home. Perhaps such a 
chair is never in fact sat upon! Does it still count as a chair? Intuitively, yes; what else 
could it be? But it clearly wasn’t created with the intended function of supporting a 
sitting person. Or consider a work of art, say a painting. Perhaps the artist had created her 
painting with the intended function of making people cry. Is the painting now, having 
learned this information about the artist’s intentions, a “cry-maker”? No, it’s clearly a 
painting; just intending it to function a certain way doesn’t necessarily make it anything 
different. Even the artist, fully open about her intentions, would claim she made a 
painting and not a cry-maker.  
But if the joints of artifacts are to be demarcated by something besides intended 
functions, what might it be? Amie Thomasson (2014, 60) writes that, “In the place of the 
idea that artifacts must have an intended function, we should generalize the idea: treating 
artifacts as things that are intentionally made, and which have at least some intended 
features – which may or may not include an intended function.” That is, to be an artifact, 
to count as a member of a genuine artifact kind, is to have at least one intended feature, 
whether that be a function, structural property, or what have you. 15 Thomasson argues 
such features extend, in certain cases like art and places of worship, to norms of use, 
treatment and regard. So, what makes a church a church, and not a private home or 
gymnasium, is that it was intended to be treated and regarded a certain way (by a certain 
group of people). You ought to behave in some ways, but not others, in church. 
Thomasson concludes:  
[T]he definitive intended properties for membership in public kinds typically include 
not merely functional or structural features, but also being intended to be subject to 
certain norms, where this is understood as the object being recognizable (by and 
intended audience) as to be treated, used, regarded, etc. in certain ways…. To intend 
to make a work of art, a cathedral, a cheese sauce, or a top hat is (inter alia) to intend 
to make something that is to be recognized as subject to certain norms of use, 
                                                                 
15
 For more on the role of intentions in artifacts, see Risto Hilpinen (1992, 1993, 2011). See also, 
Thomasson (2005).  
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treatment, regard, etc. by an appropriate (intended) audience. (2014, 64 [emphasis 
original])     
So, if we’re to count objects like paintings, prototypes and places of worship as 
artifacts, which intuition suggests we should, then something along the lines of 
Thomasson’s suggestion must be enacted. So, for my purposes here, I’ll take an artifact 
to be an object made by a suitably intelligent being with the intention of instantiating 
some suitable feature. The intended property might be to function a certain way, or it 
might simply be to be regarded a certain way. (I’ll also assume, following Hilpinen 
(1993), Bloom (1996) and Thomasson (2003), that objects purporting to be artifacts of a 
certain kind have some sort of success criteria. That is, the object in question must have a 
suitably decent chance of successfully instantiating its intended feature/s. A 
“screwdriver” made of chocolate cannot really be a screwdriver.)16 I say “suitable” 
because not all intended features are characteristic of artifacts. For instance, a chemist 
may intend to create an object with certain features, say, the micro-structural features 
characteristic of sodium chloride crystals. But clearly sodium chloride crystals are not 
artifacts, even if said chemist were to have created the first instances of them (like some 
physicists have created the elements Copernicium and Einsteinium). An easy way of 
distinguishing cases like this from the creation of genuine artifacts is that the former may 
be said to have an “internal essence” while the latter lack any such essence. 17 Artifactual 
essences are not, in the relevant sense, internal to the objects they characterize: a 
screwdriver is steel or iron with a wooden or plastic handle. What it is to be a 
screwdriver is to have an intended function F, and to be crafted of any materials M1, M2, 
…Mn  suitable to carrying out F. But what it is to be Einsteinium has nothing to do with 
functions, features or materials of a certain sort: Einsteinium can only be of a material 
with an atomic number of 99; that is what it is to be Einsteinium.  
So, our revised working definition of an artifact is: an object made by a suitably 
intelligent being with the intention of instantiating some suitable, non-natural feature.18 
This digression helps to highlight one more important, indeed vital, point about 
artifacts. Artifacts are in some very important respect mind-dependent. If there were no 
mind to intend for artifacts to exist, there would be no artifacts. So much is rather 
intuitive and completely uncontroversial, even among the most strident defenders of the 
ontological credentials of artifacts. What exactly such mind-dependence amounts to, 
                                                                 
16
 Perhaps we fo llow Aristotle and say it is a screwdriver “only in name”.  
17
 Another way of making this point is to say non-artifactual kinds are governed by laws of nature. See 
Lowe (2006, 156-72). Cf. also Franssen and Kroes (2014).  
18
 Natural is to be contrasted with art ifactual, not supernatural. I won’t take a stance here on the tools of 
spirits. Note too, the circularity lurking here. I won’t worry myself too much with it here because (1) it is 
not my goal to provide a reductive definit ion of art ifacts, and (2) I take the distinction between genuine 
artifacts and “pseudo-artifacts” like man-made elements to be clear and obvious enough. See section 3.2 
below for more on this.  
It’s All in Your Head: A Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence | 9 
 
however, is where philosophers disagree. In the following, I argue it entails that artifacts 
are constituents of the mind and not the external world populated by familiar objects like 
trees and lumps of gold.    
2.3 The World Contains No Artifact Joints 
If artifacts populate the world in much the same way that lumps of gold and trees 
do, one would expect they and their joints to behave in a fashion similar to the joints of 
such non-artifactual objects. That is, if tables and statues are to be considered amongst 
the furniture of the world, they ought to be, metaphysically, a lot like the rest of the 
furniture we’d ordinarily take there to be (like, for instance, the wood and lump of gold 
said objects are made of, respectively).19 What else could it mean to say that statues, 
tables and screwdrivers are just as real as the indifferent materials purportedly 
composing them? In the following three sub-sections I argue artifacts and their joints are 
too dissimilar from the joints of natural, mind-independent objects like lumps of gold and 
trees to be considered ontologically serious. But, for artifacts to be less “ontologically 
serious” than trees or lumps of gold doesn’t obviously entail their non-existence. In fact, 
as it stands, it doesn’t say much. So, in the following section, I provide an account of 
what this non-serious existence amounts to.  
2.3.1 No Powers, No Joints, No Artifacts 
Why think artifacts and their joints are less real than those of natural objects like 
trees and lumps of gold? Precisely because the objects we’d ordinarily take to be 
artifacts, like our statue Goliath, are nothing but the natural objects purportedly 
composing them, plus some intention – some mental state. To see why this is so, consider 
the following thought experiment. There are two worlds, w1 and w2, identical in every 
respect except that w1 contains intelligent life. Imagine that both worlds are very much 
like our world: full of artifacts like cars, golden statues, and screwdrivers. So, the primary 
difference between w1 and w2 is that the former will contain the requisite intentions to 
bring artifacts into being (plus the intelligent life needed for such intentions). Now, do 
what every good philosopher wants to do and take a “God’s Eye” view at these two 
worlds. Besides the existence of intelligent creatures in w1, what mind- independent 
difference is there between the two worlds? What joints does w1 have w2 lacks? There is 
absolutely no difference—their joints are identical. There has been no “addition of being” 
in w1 besides the intentions—the mental states—necessary for artifacts to exist. Surely 
these intentions haven’t bestowed upon the natural objects of which they’re composed 
any casually relevant powers that would give us reason to suppose they’re something 
                                                                 
19
 Again, my aim in this paper is not to argue for what the real or most genuine material objects are, 
whether mereological simples, living beings, conscious beings, or some other objects. Recalling my 
assumptions in section 2.1 above, I’ll take the existence of things like lumps of gold and trees as pre -
philosophical data.   
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besides just these natural objects—lumps of gold and rods of steel connected to portions 
of plastic or wood.20 To illustrate with a more concrete example, consider a statue 
composed of pure elemental sodium. Sodium explodes violently when it comes into 
contact with water. Perhaps you don’t like the smug expression on the statue’s face, and 
you decide to throw it into a lake. What happens? The sodium reacts with the water to 
produce a relatively good-sized explosion. But did the statue’s statueness, its belonging 
to the kind “statue”, make any difference whatsoever to the causal structure of the event 
that transpired? Has the fact that the object thrown into the lake was a statue factored into 
a genuine explanation of what happened (cf. Lowe 2014, 25)? No, not at all. If someone 
walking around the lake heard the explosion and ran over asking about what had 
happened and you responded, “I threw a statue in the lake”, they’d respond with a 
befuddled stare. That the object was a statue, and not just an intricately arranged mass of 
sodium, explains nothing about the world’s causal structure. But if this is so, why say the 
statue, qua artifact, exists “out there” in the world? Why not admit of just the mass of 
sodium?21  
Now, perhaps that the object was a statue didn’t make a causal difference in the 
above example doesn’t mean it is so with all examples. For, doesn’t a statue have powers, 
causally relevant properties and capacities, that the sodium lacks? For example, imagine 
I’ve commissioned an artist to sculpt for me a statue of my recently deceased 
grandmother. Now, every time I look at the statue I remember my grandmother and cry. 
Isn’t this proof the statue does in fact have causally relevant properties the mass of 
material composing it lacks, viz. the power to make me remember my grandmother 
(Baker 2004, 100-1)? To this I have two responses. First is that the purported power of 
reminding one of their grandmother is best described as a structural property instantiated 
by the mass of material. That is, the mass of material instantiates a structure that looks 
like a human face, a specific human face of great importance to you. But this structural 
property isn’t a unique power “above and beyond” the mass; it isn’t anything that would 
indicate the existence of the artifact kind “statue”. Moreover, all sorts of objects remind 
people of things; but it seems rather odd to say this shows that such a range of objects has 
some single power: the power of reminding you of x. Such a power on the face of it 
seems to lack credibility. Secondly, one might explain the statue’s purported power 
simply as a manifestation condition for your own power of remembering your 
                                                                 
20
 Consider an arithmetical analogy. A K (art ifact instance) is an x (lump of go ld) and a y (intended 
feature), so that: K=x+y. To reasonably claim K is mind-independent, we’d want to see y exist without x in 
the world. For, if all that was mind-independent was x, we’d have no reason to suppose K as the sum of x 
and y was mind-independent. But, alas, the world tells us that nothing but x is mind-independent. We see 
no y by itself; we can’t subtract x from K and see y. y is in someone’s head! So why posit K as a whole as 
mind-independent? Think on this: have you ever encountered a statue (or any artifact) simpliciter?  
21
 This is not what Thomasson (2006, 353-6) calls a “nothing over and above” objection to statues. The 
mereological whole in this example, the mass  of sodium, might be doing something over and above its 
parts (though I doubt this in the case of masses). Nor is this a causal redundancy argument against wholes. 
It is aimed at just artifacts, qua artifactual, whatever their mereological structure.   
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grandmother. So instead of attributing a unique power to the statue, the reminding you of 
grandmother power, the more plausible explanation would be to say the structural 
property of the mass triggered you, an object with the d isposition to remember grandma, 
to remember grandma. To attribute such a power to the statue is simply to project one’s 
own powers onto the world. If either of these two explanations is right, we’ve avoided 
attributing the statue any unique powers that would grant it some real joints in the world.  
Now, one might object that even if statues don’t have unique powers or capacities 
“out there” in the world, or even if they don’t often factor into the explanations of all 
events, certainly they’re required for some explanations. For example, consider a 
construction worker, Craig, who’s having a rather tough day. Craig lost his tool belt last 
night and on his way into work, his wallet is stolen. Now, without tools, Craig must either 
show up to work and get fired for losing company property, or somehow find some tools. 
But, without his wallet, Craig can’t purchase any tools. So, against his better judgment, 
Craig shoplifts a variety of tools from the hardware store. When finally caught by the 
authorities, Craig is asked to explain why he stole what he did. He confesses, “I needed 
these tools because if I didn’t show up with them, I’d get fired.” Now, clearly Craig 
didn’t steal a screwdriver because he needed a rod of steel fastened to a plastic handle. 
He shoplifted the screwdriver because he needed a screwdriver, an artifact. In the case of 
Craig, it seems, we can’t just appeal to the indifferent materials the tools are composed of 
to explain what happened. But, we clearly don’t need to posit the extra-mental existence 
of screwdrivers and other artifacts to explain why Craig did what he did. All we need to 
explain the case of Craig is to show that Craig takes an object, of such and such 
materials, arranged thus and so, to be a “screwdriver” and not something else. That is, all 
we need to explain Craig’s actions is to have Craig, and other relevant parties, believe 
that the objects he stole were “tools” and not indifferent materials. So, we could perfectly 
well explain the case of Craig with, say, an account of artifacts that takes them to be mere 
mental “projections” onto indifferent materials—though surely indifferent materials of a 
certain sort, arranged a certain way. Just as we can appeal to the tooth fairy to explain 
certain actions and phenomena without making it an object of the extra-mental world, we 
can explain the case of Craig and others like it without making entities to which they 
appeal, viz. artifacts, objects of the extra-mental world.   
2.3.2 Against Proper Function (and Morphology and Historical Placement) 
So, if correct, has my attempted extirpation of unique artifact joints wholly done 
away with arguments for their mind- independent existence? If only I were so lucky! For, 
some have argued the joints of artifacts are demarcated and set by properties other than 
those I’ve targeted above. Specifically, philosophers have argued that the intended proper 
functions essential to artifacts are mind- independent and thus qualify artifacts as 
respectable citizens of the extra-mental world (Elder 2014). Before fully presenting this 
strategy, let me briefly explain the notion of proper function.  
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Crawford Elder (2014; see also 1989, 1998, 2007b) has argued a good realist, 
which I would count myself as, needs a non-arbitrary way to demarcate the persistence 
conditions, i.e. the joints, of mind-independent natural kinds and their instances. 
Otherwise, the amorphous world of the anti-realist reigns supreme: something a good 
realist should want to avoid. Elder, whom I imagine considers himself a good realist, has 
argued the essences of natural kinds, and therefore their identity conditions, can be 
demarcated by certain casually relevant property clusters. These property clusters are 
“geared together” in such a way that, if you “turn the knobs” on the values of one such 
property, the others will change in like manner. In the case of natural kinds like gold or 
water, there is just a single such “master” property, the atomic number 79 or the 
microstructure H20, which grounds and controls most of the other properties of the kind 
(Elder, 2007c). This causal-gearing approach to essences applies, says Elder, to certain 
artifact kinds as well (what he calls “copied kinds”). But, rather than some one particular 
master property, artifacts are characterized by a group of properties: (1) morphology or 
structure, (2) historical placement and (3) proper function. Proper function, arguably the 
closest to a “master” property in artifact essences, is that intended function for which 
producers of an artifact kind have continuously produced it, and/or that function for 
which consumers or users have purchased it (Elder 2007b, 35-40; 2014, 33-6). It is what 
an artifact “is for”, “supposed to do”; it is the function of that kind. But this proper 
function, argues Elder, is completely mind-independent, and therefore respectable in a 
realist ontology:  
That person after person after person has produced an X, or that person after 
 person after person has used an X, often cannot causally be accounted for by 
 adverting merely to intentions harbored in the heads of individuals [of] either 
 group…. The causal efficacy  for replication lies in actual past performances, not 
 past intentions or expectations of performance…. The conclusion that I myself 
 am inclined to draw is that even though it is  our conscious activities that underlie 
 the characteristic proper functions of artifacts, those proper functions are not 
 “mind-dependent” in a sense that need trouble realists. (2014, 35-6)   
 So, if I understand Elder correctly, the point is that proper functions, arguably the 
master properties of artifact kinds, are mind- independent features of the world and thus 
count the objects they characterize, artifacts, as respectable citizens in the realist’s 
ontology. Proper functions, he says, are not up to the mental activities of any persons, 
whether they are producers or users. (Nor are the historical placements or morphologies 
up to the mental activities of any mind.) Doesn’t this count in favor of the mind-
independence of artifacts? For, if artifacts were just creations of the mind, wouldn’t these 
essential features of theirs be “up to” the minds responsible for their existence? 
Unfortunately for artifacts, I am inclined to draw a different conclusion than Elder. I am 
inclined to think (1) proper functions as Elder describes them do not exist mind-
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independently (or at all), and (2) that even if they did, they wouldn’t be able to bolster the 
ontological standing of the artifacts they characterize. Let me defend these two claims in 
turn.  
I am disinclined to admit of proper functions for artifacts precisely because I think 
artifacts may be essentially characterized by features besides functions. As we saw in 
section 2.2, many artifacts we’d ordinarily take to exist have no function, let alone a 
proper function: they simply have intended features. A chair can be created, with the 
right morphology and historical placement mind you, but lack the intended proper 
function of supporting a sitting person. We’d countenance such an object as a chair 
nonetheless. So, Elder’s definition is too narrow: he affords too few artifacts the status as 
such. But, even so, Elder (2007b, 35) acknowledges his defense might not save all artifact 
kinds, so let us restrict ourselves to those artifacts he takes up the sword for. Let’s 
consider screwdrivers as a representative example. Return now to the original question: 
Do screwdrivers have a proper function? Again, I say “No”. Why? Because the very 
concept of an artifact having a proper function reeks of an ontological authoritarianism 
no one ought to stand. That is, who made Elder, or similar defenders of proper functions 
(see n. 14 above), the Czar of artifacts? To see the problem more clearly, consider the 
following. Two completely disparate cultures, Culture1 and Culture2, produce a 
qualitatively identical artifact composed of, say, a single one inch cube of steel. Both 
cultures have developed the artifact along “proper” historical lineages and apply the same 
exact morphology. Producers and consumers, in each culture respectively, make and 
purchase the artifact for a certain purpose. Thus, the artifact qualifies as a “copied kind”. 
Culture1 declares the artifact’s proper function is that it is to be used while playing a 
certain board game while Culture2 deems the proper function of the artifact is that it is to 
be used as a lure in hunting wild game. Now, imagine representatives from each culture 
are called upon to help settle an ontological dispute over the artifact. Both groups are 
asked, “What is this object: a board game piece or a hunting lure?” Predictably, 
representatives from Culture1 say the object truly is a board game piece, and 
representatives from Culture2 say the object truly is a hunting lure. Surely, both groups 
can’t be right though. If so, it would entail each culture has a unique and equally 
legitimate ontology, but that’s something good realists like Elder and I want to avoid—
and especially so if Elder wants to count said artifacts among the furniture of the world. 
But, surely neither culture is right either! How could it be the case that either culture is 
truly correct in the dispute? The only reasonable answer to the question of what the 
object truly is is that it is whatever either culture says it is. But if that is so, there is no 
such thing as a proper function, what an artifact is really for, only a relative proper 
function. And surely a relative proper function like this isn’t respectable enough to make 
it into a genuine realist’s ontology. Surely it isn’t a grand fact about the nature of the 
world’s constituents?     
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But, even if there is such a thing as a proper function, or if a relative proper 
function is respectable enough, it isn’t enough to count the objects such functions 
characterize as mind-independent in their own right. This is because there is no need to 
posit the existence of an artifact, let’s again say a screwdriver, to which such a proper 
function belongs. All one needs to say—in fact, what one should say—is that a rod of 
steel fastened to a handle of wood or plastic has the proper function F. That is, the 
indifferent materials, M1, M2,…Mn, arranged thus and so, have the proper function F, and 
that’s it (adding: “That’s what a ‘screwdriver’ is.”). It cannot be the case that these 
materials so arranged having a proper function brings about an addition of be ing. Just 
because a rod of steel connected to a piece of wood or plastic is for turning screws 
doesn’t mean the artifact kind we characterize it as is real—as something besides just 
these materials out in the world. In fact, I can’t see how it could. If we assign some 
proper function, along with some proper morphological and historical lineages, to some 
indifferent materials, how is it that we’ve done any ontological work? Even if it is a 
grand fact about the nature of the world that we’ve declared these materials so arranged 
to have the proper function F, even if the proper function F is mind- independent, how is it 
that such a state of affairs adds anything to the materials? How can all this be object-
producing? How do historical, morphological and functional facts produce “object 
facts”? Again, I simply cannot see how it could be so. So even if certain objects have 
mind- independent proper functions, this isn’t enough to make the artifacts said functions 
characterize extra-mental constituents of the world. All this tells us is that a group of 
intelligent creatures has regularly assigned some function to certain materials arranged 
thus and so; that there is a mind- independent definition for “screwdriver”. But it isn’t an 
existential argument for the reality of what these creatures say the materials are.22  
Now, perhaps Elder will object that I’ve missed an important point about artifact 
essences. Perhaps, he might admit, it isn’t quite enough for the extra-mental existence of 
artifacts that their essences—proper functions, etc—be mind- independent. But, what is 
enough for the extra-mental existence of artifacts, or at least suggests it, is that their 
essences are “inductively rich”. That is, we can consistently run successful, non-
accidental inductions from the essences of artifacts to other properties of theirs (Elder 
2007c, 2014). So, for example, if I know an artifact has been produced with proper 
function F, I’ll be able to successfully arrive, via induction, at other properties of it, say 
its having a certain tensile strength, or being made of a very specific material. But this is 
just to say copied kinds, artifact kinds, behave in much the same way as do natural kinds, 
i.e. as inductively rich. Artifact kinds have, says Elder, “hidden necessities” in the 
terminology of Jim Ross (2008). And certainly I would admit of natural kinds; indeed, 
                                                                 
22
 Franssen and Kroes (2014) argue for the mind-independent existence of artifacts in a fashion similar to 
Elder, but focus on morphology and historical lineage. Since their arguments are of the same kin, I take my 
response to Elder here to apply to Franseen and Kroes’ recent work too.   
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I’ve relied on the very reality of such kinds! So, might the clustering of properties around 
an artifact’s essence give credence to their ontological standing?  
In short, no. Firstly, this argument is only as strong as the analogy between copied 
kinds and natural kinds, and it isn’t clear that “inductive richness” is a strong enough link 
to make the analogy work. (Consider whether or not instances of copied kinds, say, a 
screwdriver, obey laws of nature like instances of natural kinds.) But, more importantly, 
inductive richness, just like proper function, morphology and historical lineage, isn’t 
clearly object-producing. How is it, I ask, that the non-accidental clustering of properties 
around the essences of artifacts is a sign of ontological addition? It can’t just be the fact 
that property G non-accidentally clusters around proper function F that counts artifacts of 
a certain kind as constituents of the external world. As I put it above, it’s unclear how 
property-clustering facts could entail object facts—how does property clustering entail 
that a hunk of steel is a knife and not just a hunk of steel? Plus, one can imagine cases 
where concepts, mental entities, are inductively rich. But we wouldn’t want an ontology 
to count such mental entities as mind- independent constituents of the world. For example, 
if I’m a clothing designer, some of my pieces will have proper functions that require 
certain morphologies. And those morphologies might entail that I have to use a certain 
material, say nylon, for my design. So, in a way, my concept of a certain design, the 
essence of a copied kind, has built in “hidden necessities”. That is, my concept of the 
design has, built into it essence, property requirements for its successful implementation. 
But surely we wouldn’t want this property clustering to count my design, my concept of 
an artifact kind, as furniture of the world? The mere clustering of properties just doesn’t 
seem capable of counting some entity as an object of the external world. So, to conclude, 
the fact artifact essences may be inductively rich does not, by itself, suggest artifacts are 
constituents of the mind- independent world; mere resemblance to natural kinds doesn’t, 
so easily, catapult artifacts onto the ontological stage of natural kind instances.    
2.3.3 Thinking So Doesn’t Make it So 
So far I’ve argued against the mind- independent existence of artifacts on three 
fronts. First I showed how materials counted as artifacts, like a mass of intricately shaped 
sodium, are the only objects doing any sort of causal work. The powers of such materials 
are the only powers we see, touch, experiment on, or draw on to expla in events. Next, I 
argued that, despite the efforts of some artifact defenders, artifacts indeed don’t “do 
anything” their constituent materials don’t already do. Artifacts have no unique powers or 
capacities beyond their constituent materials. Thirdly, I argued that artifacts couldn’t be 
characterized by mind- independent proper functions, and that, even if they could, this 
would only entail that the indifferent materials composing artifacts have proper functions. 
So, in sum, I’ve argued there is nothing in the mind- independent world that artifacts can 
be supported by to grant them a place in a good realist ontology. But, there is another 
strategy some have pursued to count artifacts among the furniture of the world: the so-
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called “thinking makes it so” or “easy ontology” approach. So, before I close the file on 
the existence of artifacts, let me address this last approach.  
What I’ll call here the “thinking-makes- it-so” approach to artifacts goes roughly 
as follows. If we want to see if an X exists, what we should do is pinpoint the concept of 
what X is and then look to the world to see if said concept is satisfied. So, for example, if 
we want to see if screwdrivers exist, we should get a hold of our concept of what a 
screwdriver is and then see if there exists something in the world that satisfies the 
concept of screwdriver. Lowe (2014) attributes such a view to David Wiggins (2001), but 
whether his assessment of Wiggins is in fact correct, one clearly sees a thinking-makes-it-
so approach in the work of Amie Thomasson (2001, 2007a, 2007b, 2009).23 So, here I’ll 
present my reasons for thinking such an approach cannot establish the mind- independent 
existence of artifacts, interacting with Thomasson, but aimed primarily at the thinking-
makes- it-so approach more broadly.  
To get a better sense of the approach, consider the following remarks Thomasson 
makes on determining whether or not we should admit of the existence of some entity:  
 Is it at all possible, then, to propose a non-question-begging strategy for 
 determining what entities should be accepted into one’s ontology? I think it is: for 
 any purported kind of entity, first, determine what it would take for there to be 
 such an entity, then attempt to establish whether those criteria are 
 fulfilled….According to the criteria built into the idea of something being an 
 artifactual kind term, what must be the case for there to be artifacts and artifactual 
 kinds? There must, as we have seen earlier, be people with certain intentions to 
 create objects of a given kind, where these intentions are substantive and involve 
 certain success criteria that control their activity, and they must be largely 
 successful in executing their intentions. Do we have reason to think this is ever 
 done? Barring radical conspiracy theories, of course we do. (2007b, 72 [emphasis 
 original]) 
Do screwdrivers exist? According to Thomasson, yes. But it isn’t clear what this 
existence amounts to. On her account here, are screwdrivers constituents of the mind-
independent world? Maybe, maybe not. I won’t speculate on what Thomasson’s ultimate 
opinion on the matter is here.24 What I will do though, is show that the thinking-makes-it-
                                                                 
23
 Lowe (2014, 20) calls the view “Conceptual Realism” and Thomasson describes it as “ontology made 
easy”.  
24
 In places, Thomasson seems to indicate she’s fine without counting artifacts among the “furniture of the 
world”. For instance, she writes (2001, 157): “Now it might be said that the realist can, perhaps, accept that 
there are facts of geography…and objects of geographic kinds involved (e.g. national parks), but that in 
virtue of their mind-dependence the realist must deny that they are part of the ‘furn iture of the world’ . If 
this is taken to mean that they are not among the mind-independent components of nature, this is fairly 
unobjectionable…” But, in other p laces (2003, 605), she seems to suggest things like statues exist mind-
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so approach cannot plausibly establish the mind- independent, extra-mental existence of 
artifacts.  
Imagine a physicist named Stephanie. Stephanie has been theorizing about zubers, 
truly fascinating objects, for some time now. Zubers are very much like electrons except 
that they are shot out of an electron gun with the intention of creating the imagine of a 
smiley face on an electron detection device. Thus, there are criteria for whether or not 
zubers exist; Stephanie has the concept of what it is to be a zuber. Stephanie publishes a 
paper on zubers, claiming to have discovered a new sub-atomic entity. It doesn’t take too 
long for Stephanie’s colleagues to dismiss her work though. And it is very clear to see 
why Stephanie’s work is dismissed. Stephanie’s “discovery” of zubers has told scientists 
nothing about the way the world is, nothing about what really exists out there in the 
world. It has simply retold a story about electrons that we already knew, but under a 
different title, “zubers”. So what moral are we to glean from the story of Stephanie? It’s 
that seeing if concepts are satisfied by the world tells us nothing about the world. In fact, 
it gets the whole ontological enterprise backwards. It is the world that ought to tell us 
what it contains, and not the other way around: the thinking-makes- it-so approach simply 
reads what it wants off the world. It then submits its ontological results as genuine, when 
we can clearly tell they aren’t. It is ontology made way too easy.  But it isn’t hard to 
realize that taking an object to be a K, seeing it as a K, doesn’t in fact make it a K. We 
have to interview the world to find out if Ks exist. So the story goes with artifacts: if we 
truly want to know if the world contains artifacts, we need to listen to the world, not see 
what sort of “objects” we can force it to create for us through “effortless armchair 
authority”.25 To recall the opening of this paper, the acceptance of the thinking-makes-it-
so approach appears tantamount to an endorsement of magic. But good metaphysicians 
aren’t magicians.  
2.4 What an Artifact Is 
So far I’ve argued for what an artifact is not: a mind- independent object out there 
in the world around us. Although I’ve done my best to ensure the reader understands I 
don’t doubt the existence of artifacts simpliciter, I’ve said very little about what their 
“non-serious” existence amounts to. Thus, I owe an account of what an artifact actually 
is. Here I briefly outline what my arguments thus far entail about the ontological status of 
artifacts. 
In section 2.2 I said an artifact was an object made by a suitably intelligent being 
with the intention of instantiating some suitable, non-natural feature. If my arguments 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
independently inasmuch as the hunks of clay composing them exist mind-independently. Again, I won’t 
speculate on her ultimate opinion, but she doesn’t immediately appear committed to screwdrivers, statues 
and the like populating the mind-independent world in the way I find objectionable.   
25
 The pithy phrase is from Elder (2014, 41).  
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above are correct though, artifacts aren’t objects at all; they don’t exist out there in the 
world like lumps of gold and trees do. So when a suitably intelligent being creates an 
artifact, it isn’t really creating an object at all. But what remains from the above 
definition if artifacts aren’t objects? Intended features: ways indifferent materials are to 
be treated, regarded, used etc. Now, if my argument against proper functions (and 
morphologies and historical placements) as mind- independent features of artifacts is 
right, then it ought to be applicable to any feature of an artifact. 26 If this is so, then any 
intended feature of an artifact is just a feature of the indifferent materials purportedly 
composing said artifact. So if intended features aren’t really out there in artifacts, but just 
in indifferent materials, and artifacts as such aren’t objects beyond or in addition to the 
materials composing them, what are they? Artifacts are, I think, nothing but intentions, 
i.e. mental states. More precisely: artifacts are simply ways suitably intelligent beings 
conceive of the indifferent materials of the world. So, to say an artifact exists is just to 
say that some intelligent being intends to treat, regard, and/or use the indifferent materials 
of the world in a certain way: as an object to open bottle caps, as an object to support a 
sitting person, or as an object to be regarded as holy, beautiful, or what have you. The 
deep ontological story about artifacts is that they’re in our minds, as conceptions about 
how we treat, regard, and/or use the real constituents of the world. From an ontological 
point of view, the mind- independent world is composed of objects and the mental states 
of some of those objects (viz. suitably intelligent beings). Artifacts just are some of those 
mental states; the concepts about intended treatments, regards, uses, etc. So, do artifacts 
exist? Yes, they do: suitably intelligent creatures do in fact have intentions to treat, 
regard, and/or use the indifferent materials of the world in certain ways.    
2.5 Solving Artifact Coincidence  
Recall the example of Goliath and Lump. Goliath is a statue and Lump is the mass 
of gold supposedly composing Goliath. Goliath and Lump fill exactly the same region of 
space-time, but appear to have different persistence conditions: Lump can survive 
smashing, but Goliath cannot. So it appears we have at least two objects in the same exact 
region of space-time. So goes the problem of object coincidence.  
What’s important to notice in the case of Goliath and Lump though, as noted at 
the outset, is that Goliath is an artifact, a statue. Strangely, only a few philosophers have 
approached the problem of object coincidence with this point in mind.27 But what’s so 
important about one of the purportedly coinciding objects being an artifact? What’s 
                                                                 
26
 That is, there are no Czars of proper norms of regard or treatment, nor do we need to say that if such 
proper features did exist, that they’d belong to artifacts above and  beyond the indifferent materials of the 
world.  
27
 For instance, Patrick Toner provides two distinct solutions to the problem of co incidence: one for 
artifacts, what he calls “accidental unities” (2006), and one for cases involving, say, a tree and the mas s of 
cells composing it (2008).  
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important is that if I’m right about the ontological status of artifacts, all instances of 
artifact coincidence simply fail to get off the ground. That is, if statues and all other 
artifacts are just ways in which we conceive of the indifferent materials of the world 
(Lump, the mass of gold, in our example), then we can deny Goliath is really out there in 
the world. And if Goliath isn’t a constituent of the mind- independent world, then he 
certainly cannot coincide with Lump. And so it will go with all other instances of artifact 
coincidence: screwdrivers cannot coincide with steel rods and plastic handles, tables 
cannot coincide with pieces of wood, and homes cannot coincide with cement, timber, 
and sheetrock. In all cases of artifact coincidence, one of the “objects” will simply be in 
us—in our heads— as a conception about how the real objects, the world’s indifferent 
materials, are to be treated, used, regarded, etc. If this is right, then it is never the case 
that an artifact coincides with the object(s) “composing” it.  
3. OBJECTIONS 
It’s yet to be seen, however, if my arguments above, and so my solution to artifact 
coincidence, are on point. So, to test their metal, let me now raise and respond to some 
likely objections and clarify my position.  
3.1 The Clarity of Artifact Persistence Conditions 
One might ask: what of the difference in properties, modal profiles specifically, 
that first allowed the problem of coincidence to get off the ground? If my account is right, 
how is it that artifacts like Goliath appear to have relatively clear-cut persistence 
conditions? Where do these persistence conditions come from? That is, why is it so clear 
to us, if artifacts are just in our minds, when artifacts go in and out of existence? If my 
account is right, the persistence conditions of artifacts clearly originate and are grounded 
in us, in our concepts about artifact kinds (Cf. Sutton 2012, 707-19). What makes it such 
that Goliath cannot survive smashing is that he no longer can instantiate the intended 
feature he was crafted for when smashed. If statues are created to instantiate some 
property F, then statues exist just as long as they can, with a reasonable chance, 
instantiate F. That is, an artifact will exist so long as the indifferent materials it’s 
composed of have a reasonable chance of instantiating the relevant intended feature(s). 
Catherine Sutton explains:  
 Consider two different scenarios, in which the inventor [of an artifact] has 
 different purposes for her invention, and which lead to different answers about 
 persistence. If she invented the widget to prop up heavy windows, then it could 
 not survive being hollowed out because hollowing would compromise structural 
 integrity, and part of being a widget is being able to hold open windows. If 
 instead her widget was a representational tool to teach children about family 
 trees… then surely the widget could survive being hollowed out. These 
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 persistence properties arise in virtue of the purpose of a kind, and purpose is 
 determined by human intentions… (2012, 711-2) 
So, even though artifacts are, in ontological strictness, only in the mind, we can 
still account for their possession of relatively clear persistence conditions. And we can do 
so without recourse to anything in the external world besides the indifferent materials 
composing artifacts.   
3.2 Artifacts With “Internal Essences” 
In section 2.2 I drew a distinction between artifact kinds and natural kinds by 
claiming the latter have an “internal essence” that the former lack. Another way of 
putting this is that natural kinds have a nature of their own, a unique “unifying principle 
of activity” (Lowe 2014, 24). Some philosophers prefer to say such natural kinds obey 
the laws of nature (again, see n. 17 above). But it has been argued certain artifacts, viz. 
machines, have internal essences and unifying principles of activity of their own. 
Machines appear to have internal natures and follow certain laws of nature, engineering 
laws, and so appear to behave in much the same way as natural kinds. 28 As Lowe argues:  
 A Martian, visiting Earth after all human life had been extinguished, could surely 
 recognize in a working piston engine an object that does something, by its own 
 very nature – for example, the pistons turn the crankshaft, the valves regulate the 
 pressure in the pistons, and so on. The Martian would not need to know of any 
 use to which humans had put such engines in order to recognize this fact. (2014, 
 24 [original emphasis]) 
But my distinction between natural and artifactual joints, and so my reason for denying 
the world contains any artifact joints (section 2.3), hinges on the former lacking an 
internal essence or principle of activity. If machines have such an essence, then they 
might have a claim to mind-independent existence, and so might coincide with the 
indifferent materials composing them.   
 One way to respond to this challenge is to cast doubt of the nomic legitimacy of 
the “engineering laws” Lowe draws on. He (2014, 25) writes, “Nonetheless, [machines] 
do have a real ‘nature’ of their own, because their creators endow them with a unifying 
principle of activity that is governed by mind- independent laws of action, specific to their 
sort or kind: engineering laws.” But are engineering laws really laws of nature, the ones 
scientists try to uncover and elucidate, ones that might help machines stand on 
ontological par with trees and lumps of metal? Perhaps, but I think the metaphysician of 
science has good prima facie reason to say “No”. For, engineering laws seem to operate 
                                                                 
28
 Lowe (2014, 25) does not argue that machine kinds are ontologically tantamount to natural kinds, but he 
does say their similarity, their having unify ing principles of activity, may count machines as constituents of 
the mind-independent world.  
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at too high of a level to count as natural, fundamental laws. Generally, laws of nature are 
thought to be those laws which govern fundamental particles, massive bodies, and 
electric charges. Engineering laws just seem too convoluted, too emergent to count as 
real scientific laws of nature; a law of nature needs to be more than just any old regularity 
or rule of thumb. And if engineering laws aren’t genuine laws of nature, then the objects 
they govern aren’t genuine either, and so may not coincide with the indifferent materials 
they’re made of.  
 But, engineering laws could turn out to be genuine, so another response is in 
order. Consider the following. Imagine all life is extinguished on Earth and the planet is 
visited by Martians. These Martians walk into the kitchen of a restaurant and find a pot of 
spaghetti on the stove with a wooden spoon in it. Now, according to Lowe, machines are 
obviously for something, they have unifying principles of activity. As he says, the pistons 
turn the crankshaft, the valves regulate pressure, etc. Might one easily suppose the pot of 
spaghetti on the stove is for something though, that it has a principle of activity? For, the 
Martians could just see, without human consultation, that the wooden spoon is for 
stirring the spaghetti so that it doesn’t burn, and that the stove is for heating the 
spaghetti. The Martians wouldn’t need to know that the intended use of the pot of food 
was to feed people to see this though. And perhaps the pot of food is governed by 
“Culinary Laws”? (Perhaps ceteris paribus laws that require a cook to be present?) Might 
these laws count it among the furniture of the world?29 Clearly it would be an 
embarrassment to Lowe’s theory to count the pot of spaghetti as a machine. Surely Lowe 
and other machine defenders wouldn’t think a pot of spaghetti has a unifying principle of 
activity? But if the pot of spaghetti is analogous to a machine, it seems Lowe would be 
committed to the pot counting as a machine, and so as a constituent of the mind-
independent world. I suggest this embarrassment warns the metaphysician against 
counting machines as genuine objects, and so as entities capable of coinciding with the 
indifferent materials of the world.    
 But, perhaps Lowe would joyfully accept pots of spaghetti into his ontology. So, 
briefly, let me provide one more response to Lowe’s account. Lowe claims engines, for 
instance, have a unifying principle of activity, or, nature. A nature is, traditionally, 
conceived as the locus of an entity’s powers and capacities. It not only governs what an 
object is, but what an object can do. Now imagine we have two qualitatively identical 
engines, but one is made of steel and the other pig iron (iron with more than 2% carbon). 
Although these two engines carry out their “engine” activities identically, they clearly 
don’t have all the same capacities. For instance, if we were to let these engines sit out in 
                                                                 
29
 My focus is not on laws of nature, and so I won’t cast doubt on the potential legit imacy of “Culinary 
Laws”. My point is simply that if such laws were to exist, according to Lowe, they’d count certain objects, 
e.g. pots of spaghetti, as constituents of the mind-independent world. That’s what’s supposed to be 
embarrassing, not “Culinary Laws” per se.  
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the rain, the one of pig iron would rust much faster than the one made of steel. Or if we 
melted down a non-essential piece of both and added, say, chromium, one of the resulting 
portions of metal would be stainless steel while the other just polluted pig iron. So, in 
short, even though the engines carry out some processes identically, they still have 
substantial differences in their powers and capacities. That is, there still seems to be a 
difference in natures between the two engines. (To recall another example, from 
antiquity: if you bury a wooden bed in the ground, it will sprout a tree, not a bed.)30 I take 
this to suggest that something besides what Lowe calls “unifying principles of activity” 
are at work in objects. If this is so, perhaps engines aren’t to be counted amongst the 
furniture of the world, or, at least, more argument is needed to establish such a 
conclusion.   
3.3 Artifact Discourse? 
If my account is correct, one might wonder if artifact discourse is meaningless, or 
at least always false. For, when we engage in talk about artifacts, we clearly aren’t 
referring to concepts in peoples’ heads; we’re talking about objects out in the world. So 
when I say, “We’ll need a screwdriver to hang that door,” am I saying something truth-
apt? And, if so, is the sentence I utter one which has a chance to latch onto anything out 
in the world? The answers to both questions are “yes”. The former is clearly true because 
we have an account of what it is to be an artifact. So, we can look to the world and see if 
that account if satisfied.31 As I said above, there are in fact minds intending objects to 
instantiate some features, so there are artifacts. Artifact discourse is truth-apt. But what 
then, are the referents of artifact discourse? The indifferent materials arranged thus and so 
which have been intended to instantiate some feature. Why is this so? Why are the 
referents not the concepts in peoples’ heads? Because our artifact intentions are about, 
projected onto, the indifferent materials of the world. This rod of steel fastened to a 
wooden handled is a “screwdriver”. The indifferent materials arranged thus and so are 
what instantiate the features necessary, according to our artifact concepts, for the 
existence of artifacts. Concepts and intentions clearly can’t drive in screws. Concepts 
can’t satisfy the features essential to artifact kinds, so they can’t be the referents of such 
terms. So, just because, ontologically speaking, artifacts are in the mind, it doesn’t entail 
that the referents for artifact terms must too be in the mind.    
Now, there are other issues in the literature on artifact discourse that I have no 
intention of contributing to here. Such issues include whether or not speakers without 
artifact concepts can refer to instances of artifacts (Kornblith 1980), and if certain 
producers or groups are in positions of epistemic privilege to artifact kinds and their 
ranges (Thomasson 2003). My point in this brief section is simply to dispel worry about 
                                                                 
30
 See Aristotle, Physics II.1.   
31
 Note that this doesn’t entail the object exists mind-independently out in the external world.  
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the possibility of genuine artifact discourse on my account. If my points above are 
correct, then the non-serious existence of artifacts need not threaten the efficacy o f 
ordinary talk including artifact terms.   
4. CONCLUSION  
To sum up, I’ve argued for the thesis that the mind- independent, extra-mental 
world isn’t populated by artifacts. My goal in doing so was to show how many cases of 
object coincidence, the thesis that more than one object can occupy the same exact region 
of space-time, cannot occur. For, if artifacts aren’t in the mind-independent world, then 
they cannot coincidence with the “indifferent materials” composing them. To reach this 
conclusion I first outlined how we come to identify objects and object kinds. Then I 
briefly sketched an account of artifacts. In the third section I provided several arguments 
showing how artifacts and artifact kinds aren’t at all like natural objects and kinds we’d 
ordinarily take to exist, e.g. trees, lumps of gold, etc. In doing so, I cut off the most 
plausible routes to mind- independent, extra-mental existence for artifacts. I then briefly 
provided an existential assessment of artifacts, and showed how that assessment solved 
cases of object coincidence.  
 But, at the outset, I suggested that my solution here couldn’t serve as a general 
solution to the problem of object coincidence. For, coincidence threatens not just in cases 
between an artifact and the indifferent materials composing it, but also between two 
natural objects, say, a tree and the mass of cells composing it. But, even if my account 
here is correct, I can’t seriously try to apply it to cases like this; neither trees nor masses 
of cells are artifacts or mind-dependent in any clear way. Trees and masses of tree cells 
would exist even if no minds did. So, we can’t treat all object terms or sortals, and their 
referents, alike. “Chair” is an artifact term that picks out an intended feature of an 
object(s) (wood, metal, etc); it isn’t itself an object! But “tree” picks out a mind-
independent organism and “mass of cells” another object filling the same exact space-
time region as the organism. So, the cases of coincidence between two natural objects are 
of a very different kind than the ones between artifacts and indifferent materials. The 
former requires a theory of composition, while the latter may be solved by an account 
like the one provided here. Although that isn’t news to material object metaphysicians, 
my arguments and proposed solution here surely are.  
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